Typewritten notes on groups and geometry.

Investigation of neural and cognitive processes underlying individual variation in moral preferences is underway, with notable similarities emerging between moral- and risk-based decision-making. Here we specifically assessed moral distributive justice preferences and non-moral financial gambling preferences in the same individuals, and report an association between these seemingly disparate forms of decision-making. Moreover, we find this association between distributive justice and risky decision-making exists primarily when the latter is assessed with the Iowa Gambling Task. These findings are consistent with neuroimaging studies (...) of brain function during moral and risky decision-making. This research also constitutes the first replication of a novel experimental measure of distributive justice decision-making, for which individual variation in performance was found. Further examination of decision-making processes across different contexts may lead to an improved understanding of the factors affecting moral behaviour. (shrink)

J. M. E. McTaggart’s anti-passage argument (the argument that time is “unreal) has misled philosophers of time for almost a century. The present paper shows that the clearest formulation of this argument, that of D. H. Mellor in Real Time II, is unsound when its premises are interpreted so that it is valid and invalid when it so interpreted that it is sound). This argument need mislead us no longer. -/- The crucial item in the interpretation of the premises is (...) the copula ‘is’, as in ‘E is past’. The copula may be either tensed or tenseless. While this ambiguity of the copula has been noted before, its implications for McTaggart’s argument had not been adequately exploited. This paper does that job. (shrink)

Aworkshop was held August 26–28, 2015, by the Earth- Life Science Institute (ELSI) Origins Network (EON, see Appendix I) at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. This meeting gathered a diverse group of around 40 scholars researching the origins of life (OoL) from various perspectives with the intent to find common ground, identify key questions and investigations for progress, and guide EON by suggesting a roadmap of activities. Specific challenges that the attendees were encouraged to address included the following: What key (...) questions, ideas, and investigations should the OoL research community address in the near and long term? How can this community better organize itself and prioritize its efforts? What roles can particular subfields play, and what can ELSI and EON do to facilitate research progress? (See also Appendix II.) The present document is a product of that workshop; a white paper that serves as a record of the discussion that took place and a guide and stimulus to the solution of the most urgent and important issues in the study of the OoL. This paper is not intended to be comprehensive or a balanced representation of the opinions of the entire OoL research community. It is intended to present a number of important position statements that contain many aspirational goals and suggestions as to how progress can be made in understanding the OoL. The key role played in the field by current societies and recurring meetings over the past many decades is fully acknowledged, including the International Society for the Study of the Origin of Life (ISSOL) and its official journal Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres, as well as the International Society for Artificial Life (ISAL). (shrink)

Should one read T.H. Irwin’s three volume history of Western ethics, or parts of it? Here one might turn to reviews. The journal The Philosophical Forum uses the sensible strategy of getting different specialists to review different parts of the book. There are two chapters on Rawls, each one reviewed by a Rawlsian. I wish to register discontent with Steven Ross’s review.

Dies ist kein perfektes Buch, aber es ist einzigartig, und wenn Sie die ersten 400 oder so Seiten überspringen, sind die letzten 300 (von etwa 700) ein ziemlich guter Versuch, das, was über Verhalten bekannt ist, auf soziale Veränderungen in Gewalt und Manieren im Laufe der Zeit anzuwenden. Das Grundthema ist: Wie kontrolliert und begrenzt unsere Genetik den gesellschaftlichen Wandel? Überraschenderweise versäumt er es, die Natur der Verwandtseinsauswahl (inklusive Fitness) zu beschreiben, die einen Großteil des tierischen und menschlichen gesellschaftlichen Lebens (...) erklärt. Ihm fehlt (wie fast jeder) ein klarer Rahmen für die Beschreibung der logischen Struktur der Rationalität (LSR – John Searles bevorzugter Begriff), den ich lieber die Deskriptive Psychologie des Höheren Ordnungsdenkens (DPHOT) nenne. Er hätte etwas über die vielen anderen Arten des Missbrauchs und der Ausbeutung von Menschen und dem Planeten sagen sollen, da diese jetzt so viel schwerwiegender sind, dass andere Formen der Gewalt fast irrelevant werden. Die Ausweitung des Konzepts der Gewalt auf die globalen langfristigen-Folgen der Replikationvon Genen von jemandem und ein Verständnis dafür, wie Evolution funktioniert (d. h. die Auswahl von Verwandten), wird eine ganz andere Perspektive auf die Geschichte, die aktuellen Ereignisse und die Wahrscheinlichkeit bieten, wie die Dinge in den nächsten paar hundert Jahren ablaufen werden. Man könnte zunächst feststellen, dass der Rückgang der körperlichen Gewalt in der Geschichte durch die ständig wachsende gnadenlose Vergewaltigung des Planeten (d.h. durch die Zerstörung der Zukunft des eigenen Nachkommen) durch die Menschen ausgeglichen (und ermöglicht) wurde.’ Pinker (wie die meisten Menschen die meiste Zeit) wird oft durch die Oberflächlichkeiten der Kultur abgelenkt, wenn es auf die Biologie ankommt. Sehen Sie hier und im Netz meine aktuellen Rezensionen zu Wilsons 'The Social Conquest of Earth' und Nowak und Highfields 'SuperCooperators' hier und im Netz für eine kurze Zusammenfassung der Leere des 'wahren Altruismus'(Gruppenauswahl) und der Funktionsweise der Verwandtschaftsauswahl und der Nutzlosigkeit und Oberflächlichkeit der Beschreibung von Verhalten in kultureller Hinsicht. Dies ist die klassische Natur/Pflege-Frage und Die Natur übertrumpft die Pflege - unendlich. Was wirklich zählt, ist die Gewalt, die der Erde durch die unerbittliche Zunahme der Bevölkerungs- und Ressourcenvernichtung (aufgrund von Medizin und Technologie und Konfliktunterdrückung durch Polizei und Militär) zugefügt wird. Etwa 200.000 mehr Menschen pro Tag (ein anderes Las Vegas alle 10 Tage, ein anderes Los Angeles jeden Monat), die etwa 6 Tonnen Oberboden, die ins Meer/Person/Jahr gehen – etwa 1% der gesamten jährlichen Verschwinden der Welt, etc. bedeuten, dass, wenn nicht irgendein Wunder geschieht, die Biosphäre und Zivilisation in den nächsten zwei Jahrhunderten, weitgehend zusammenbrechen werden, und es wird Hunger, Elend und Gewalt jeder Art in einem schwindelerregenden Ausmaß geben. Die Manieren, Meinungen und Tendenzen der Menschen, Gewalttaten zu begehen, sind ohne ihre Möglichkeit, etwas zu tun, um diese Katastrophe zu vermeiden, von Bedeutung, und ich sehe nicht, wie das geschehen wird. Es gibt keinen Raum für Argumente, und auch keinen Sinn (ja, ich bin ein Fatalist), also werde ich nur ein paar Kommentare machen, als ob es Fakten wären. Stellen Sie sich nicht vor, dass ich ein persönliches Interesse daran habe, eine Gruppe auf Kosten anderer zu fördern. Ich bin 78, habe keine Nachkommen und keine nahen Verwandtenund identifiziere mich nicht mit einer politischen, nationalen oder religiösen Gruppe und betrachte die, zu der ich standardmäßig gehöre, als ebenso abstoßend wie alle anderen. Eltern sind die schlimmsten Feinde des Lebens auf der Erde, und wenn man den weiten Blick auf die Dinge nimmt, sind Frauen so gewalttätig wie Männer, wenn man bedenkt, dass die Gewalt von Frauen (wie die meisten von Männern) weitgehend in Zeitlupe, in zeitlicher und raumweiseer Entfernung erfolgt und meist durch Stellvertreter - von ihren Nachkommen und von Männern - ausgeübt wird. In zunehmendem Maße tragen Frauen Kinder, unabhängig davon, ob sie einen Partner haben, und die Wirkung, eine Frau von der Zucht abzuhalten, ist im Durchschnitt viel größer als das Stoppen eines Mannes, da sie der Fortpflanzungsengpass sind. Man kann der Ansicht sein, dass die Menschen und ihre Nachkommen das Elend, das ihnen zukommt, verdienen und (mit seltenen Ausnahmen) die Reichen und Berühmten die schlimmsten Übeltäter sind. Meryl Streep oder Bill Gates oder J.K Rowling und jedes ihrer Kinder kann 50 Tonnen Topsoil jedes Jahr für Generationen in die Zukunft zerstören, während ein indischer Bauer und seine 1 Tonne zerstören können. Wenn jemand das leugnet, ist das in Ordnung, und zu seinen Nachkommen sage ich "Willkommen in der Hölle auf Erden" (WTHOE). Heute liegt der Schwerpunkt immer auf den Menschenrechten, aber es ist klar, dass die menschliche Verantwortung die Menschenrechte ersetzen muss, wenn die Zivilisation eine Chance haben soll. Niemand bekommt Rechte, ohne ein verantwortungsvoller Bürger zu sein, und das erste, was dies bedeutet, istdie minmale Umweltzerstörung. Die grundlegendste Verantwortung sind keine Kinder, es sei denn, eure Gesellschaft bittet euch, sie zu produzieren. Eine Gesellschaft oder eine Welt, die Menschen nach dem Zufallsprinzip züchten lässt, wird immer von egoistischen Genen ausgebeutet, bis sie zusammenbricht (oder einen Punkt erreicht, an dem das Leben so schrecklich ist, dass es nicht lebenswert ist). Wenn, die Gesellschaft weiterhin die Menschenrechte als primäre, zu ihren Nachkommen, kann man mit Zuversicht sagen "WTHOE". Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Ich beginne mit einigen berühmten Kommentaren des Philosophen (Psychologen) Ludwig Wittgenstein, weil Pinker mit den meisten Menschen (aufgrund der Standardeinstellungen unserer entwickelten angeborenen Psychologie) bestimmte Vorurteile über das Funktionieren desGeistes teilt und weil Wittgenstein einzigartige und tiefgründige Einblicke in das Wirken von Sprache, Denken und Wirklichkeit bietet (die er als mehr oder weniger koextensiv ansah), die er nirgendwo sonst findet. Diere bezieht sich nur auf Wittgenstein in diesem Band, was sehr bedauerlich ist, wenn man bedenkt, dass er der brillanteste und (...) originellste Analytiker der Sprache war. Im letzten Kapitel fasst er anhand der berühmten Metapher von Platons Höhle das Buch auf wunderbare Weise mit einem Überblick darüber zusammen, wie der Geist (Sprache, Denken, absichtliche Psychologie) – ein Produkt blinden Egoismus, nur geringfügig durch automatisierten Altruismus für nahe Verwandte, die Kopien unserer Gene tragen (Inclusive Fitness)– automatisch arbeitet, aber versucht, mit einer optimistischen Note zu enden, indem er uns Hoffnung gibt, dass wir dennoch seine enormen Fähigkeiten nutzen können, um zusammenzuarbeiten. Pinker ist sich dessen sicherlich bewusst, sagt aber wenig darüber aus, dass weit mehr über unsere Psychologie weggelassen wird als eingeschlossen. Unter den Fenstern in die menschliche Natur, die ausgelassen oder minimale Aufmerksamkeit gegeben werden, sind Mathematik und Geometrie, Musik und Klänge, Bilder, Ereignisse und Kausalität, Ontologie (Klassen von Dingen oder was wir wissen), die meisten der Erkenntnistheorie (wie wir wissen), Dispositionen (glauben, Denken, Richten, Beabsichtigen etc.) und der Rest der absichtlichen Handlungspsychologie, Neurotransmitter und Entheogene, spirituelle Zustände (z.B. Satori und Erleuchtung, Hirnstimulation und -aufzeichnung, Hirnschäden und Verhaltensdefizite und -störungen, Spiele und Sport, Entscheidungstheorie (inkl. Spieltheorie und Verhaltensökonomie), Tierverhalten (sehr wenig Sprache, aber eine Milliarde Jahre geteilte Genetik). Viele Bücher wurden über jeden dieser Bereiche der absichtlichen Psychologie geschrieben. Die Daten in diesem Buch sind Beschreibungen, keine Erklärungen, die zeigen, warum unser Gehirn es auf diese Weise tut oder wie es gemacht wird. Woher wissen wir, die Sätze auf ihre unterschiedliche Weise zu verwenden (d.h. alle ihre Bedeutungen zu kennen)? Dies ist die Evolutionspsychologie, die auf einer grundlegenderen Ebene arbeitet – der Ebene, auf der Wittgenstein am aktivsten ist. Und der Kontext, in dem Worte verwendet werden, ist kaum beachtet = eine Arena, die Wittgenstein als Pionier emittierte. Dennoch, ist dies ein klassisches Werk und mit diesen Vorsichtsmaßnahmen ist immer noch lesenswert. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Die jenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

This article is part of a For-Discussion-Section of Methods of Information in Medicine about the paper "Biomedical Informatics: We Are What We Publish", written by Peter L. Elkin, Steven H. Brown, and Graham Wright. It is introduced by an editorial. This article contains the combined commentaries invited to independently comment on the Elkin et al. paper. In subsequent issues the discussion can continue through letters to the editor.

The version uploaded to this site is a late draft. The paper arises both from William L. Rowe's classic 1979 discussion of the problem of evil, argues that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse, and also from Steven Wykstra's response, in the course of which he argues for the following Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access (CORNEA): "On the (...) basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim 'It appears that p' only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different in some way discernible by her." My paper discusses CORNEA, and proposes a replacement principle. (shrink)

Obwohl dieser Band ein wenig datiert ist, gibt es nur wenige aktuelle populäre Bücher, die sich speziell mit der Psychologie des Mordes beschäftigen und es ist ein schneller Überblick für ein paar Dollar, also noch wert die Mühe. Es macht keinen Versuch, umfassend zu sein und ist stellenweise etwas oberflächlich, wobei der Leser erwartet, die Lücken aus seinen vielen anderen Büchern und der umfangreichen Literatur über Gewalt zu füllen. Für ein Update siehe z.B. Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd (...) ed. V1 (2016) S. 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 und Buss, Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) P 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 309–312, 410 und Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014). Er gehört seit mehreren Jahrzehnten zu den beste Evolutions psychologen und deckt in seinen Arbeiten ein breites Spektrum an Verhaltensweisen ab, aber hier konzentriert er sich fast ausschließlich auf die psychologischen Mechanismen, die einzelne Menschen zum Mord führen, und ihre mögliche evolutionäre Funktion im EWR (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation – d.h. die Ebenen Afrikas in den letzten Millionen Jahren oder so). -/- Buss beginnt mit der Erkenntnis, dass wie bei anderen Verhaltensweisen "alternative" Erklärungen wie Psychopathologie, Eifersucht, soziales Umfeld, Gruppendruck, Drogen und Alkohol usw. nicht wirklich erklären, da die Frage nach wie vor bleibt, warum diese mörderische Impulse erzeugen, d.h. sie sind die nahen Ursachen und nicht die ultimativen evolutionären (genetischen) Ursachen. Wie immer läuft es unweigerlich auf inklusive Fitness (genetische Fitness von Verwandten) und damit auf den Kampf um den Zugang zu Kumpels und Ressourcen hinaus, der die ultimative Erklärung für das gesamte Verhalten in allen Organismen ist. Soziologische Daten (und der gesunde Menschenverstand) machen deutlich, dass jüngere ärmere Männchen am ehesten töten. Er präsentiert seine eigenen und andere Morddaten aus Industrienationen und Stammeskulturen, konspeziertes Töten von Tieren, Archäologie, FBI-Daten und seine eigene Forschung über die Mordfantasien normaler Menschen. Viele archäologische Beweise häufen sich weiterhin von Morden, einschließlich der von ganzen Gruppen oder von Gruppen abzüglich junger Frauen, in prähistorischen Zeiten. -/- Nachdem ich Buss' Kommentare untersucht habe, präsentiere ich eine sehr kurze Zusammenfassung der absichtlichen Psychologie (die logische Struktur der Rationalität), die in meinen vielen anderen Artikeln und Büchern ausführlich behandelt wird. -/- Diejenigen, die viel Zeit haben, die eine detaillierte Geschichte mörderischer Gewalt aus evolutionärer Perspektive wollen, können Steven Pinkers "The Better Angels of Our Nature Why Violence Has Declined" (2012) und meineRezension, leicht im Netz und in zwei meiner jüngsten Bücher lesen. Kurz, Pinker stellt fest, dass Mord hat stetig und dramatisch um den Faktor etwa 30 seit unseren Tagen als Forager gesunken. Obwohl Waffen es jetzt für jeden extrem einfach machen, zu töten, ist Tötung viel seltener. Pinker glaubt, dass dies auf verschiedene soziale Mechanismen zurückzuführen ist, die unsere "besseren Engel" hervorbringen, aber ich denke, es ist hauptsächlich auf die vorübergehende Fülle von Ressourcen durch die gnadenlose Vergewaltigung unseres Planeten zurückzuführen, gepaart mit erhöhter Polizeipräsenz, mit Kommunikations- und Überwachungs- und Rechtssystemen, die es viel wahrscheinlicher machen, bestraft zu werden. Dies wird jedes Mal deutlich, wenn es sogar eine kurze und lokale Abwesenheit der Polizei gibt. -/- Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

This paper is about the similarity between the appreciation of a piece of art, such as a cherished music album, and the loving appreciation of a person whom one knows well. In philosophical discussion about the rationality of love, the Qualities View (QV) says that love can be justified by reference to the qualities of the beloved. I argue that the oft-rehearsed trading-up objection fails to undermine the QV. The problems typically identified by the objection arise from the idea that (...) love-worthy qualities could be coarse-grained, when in fact they must be fine-grained. The analogy with appreciation of aesthetic qualities helps to draw out this point. Once the fine-grained nature of love-worthy qualities is properly understood, it is clear that critics of the QV cannot rely on the trading-up objection to motivate its rejection. Moreover, the paper’s core argument helps to illuminate the persistently aesthetic nature of interpersonal affections. (shrink)

This article argues that the aesthetics of the oppressed—a series of artistic practices elaborated by Augusto Boal (1931-2009) that comprises the theatre of the oppressed, the rainbow of desire technique, and legislative theatre—utilizes art in order to resist epistemic injustice and promote democratic freedom.

This chapter takes the form of a discussion between the editors of this volume and Steven Lukes, one the most eminent critics of methodological individualism. The focus is on Lukes’ interpretation of methodological individualism in terms of linguistic exclusivism (i.e., naive reductionism), the multiple-realization problem, Boudon’s and Elster’s micro-foundationalist approach, ontological individualism, and the rationality of human action.

Biological lineages move through time, space, and each other. As they do, they diversify, diverge, and grade away from and into one another. One result of this is genealogical discordance; i.e., the lineages of a biological entity may have different histories. We see this on numerous levels, from microbial networks, to holobionts, to population-level lineages. This paper considers how genealogical discordance impacts our study of species. More specifically, I consider this in the context of three framing questions: (1) How, if (...) at all, does genealogical discordance challenge, modify, or revise how we conceive of species? (2) How has growing appreciation of genealogical discordance impacted scientific practice? Of systematics in particular? (3) How do lineages at different levels diverge and diversify? All told, genealogical discordance enriches and complicates our taxonomic ontology, as well as the practice of reconstructing phylogenies. This presents both challenges and opportunities for the study of divergence and diversification. (shrink)

I spell out and update the individuality thesis, that species are individuals, and not classes, sets, or kinds. I offer three complementary presentations of this thesis. First, as a way of resolving an inconsistent triad about natural kinds; second, as a phylogenetic systematics theoretical perspective; and, finally, as a novel recursive account of an evolved character. These approaches do different sorts of work, serving different interests. Presenting them together produces a taxonomy of the debates over the thesis, and isolates ways (...) it has been productive. This goes to the larger point of this paper: a defense of the individuality thesis in terms of its utility, and an update of it in light of recent theoretical developments and empirical work in biology. (shrink)

I develop an account of ecological role functions—the functions of species within ecosystems—which is informed by alternative regime phenomena in ecology. My account is a causal-role theory which includes a counterfactual sensitivity condition. The account tracks and explains a distinction ecologists make between functions and various activities which are not functions. My counterfactual sensitivity condition resolves the liberality problem often attributed to causal-role theories of function, while also illuminating the explanatory centrality of role functions within ecology.

Many people are worried about the harmful effects of climate change but nevertheless enjoy some activities that contribute to the emission of greenhouse gas (driving, flying, eating meat, etc.), the main cause of climate change. How should such people make choices between engaging in and refraining from enjoyable greenhouse-gas-emitting activities? In this chapter we look at the answer provided by decision theory. Some scholars think that the right answer is given by interactive decision theory, or game theory; and moreover think (...) that since private climate decisions are instances of the prisoner’s dilemma, one rationally should engage in these activities provided that one enjoys them. Others think that the right answer is given by expected utility theory, the best-known version of individual decision theory under risk and uncertainty. In this chapter we review these different answers, with a special focus on the latter answer and the debate it has generated. (shrink)

This article examines what realists and anti-realist debates are all about. Through presenting the core of the main arguments in these debates, these are significant arguments and they are the kind of arguments that can clarify what it meant by ‘truth’ between Realist and anti-realist in general. The concluding remark is that though the main anti- realist’s arguments in these debates can be seen as some powerful arguments through raising questions on the relationship between theory and evidence, success and truth. (...) However, the success of science and the use of science in everyday life has not been given any satisfactory explanations by the anti-realists nor the use of it has been shut out from the daily life by these arguments against it. (shrink)

Do the laws of nature supervene on ordinary, non-nomic matters of fact? Lange's criticism of Humean supervenience (HS) plays a key role in his account of natural laws. Though we are sympathetic to his account, we remain unconvinced by his criticism. We focus on his thought experiment involving a world containing nothing but a lone proton and argue that it does not cast sufficient doubt on HS. In addition, we express some concern about locating the lawmakers in an ontology of (...) primitive subjunctive facts and suggest that a 'mixed' metaphysics to the lawmaker question might be attractive. (shrink)

We describe a simple, flexible exercise that can be implemented in the philosophy of science classroom: students are asked to determine the contents of a closed container without opening it. This exercise has revealed itself as a useful platform from which to examine a wide range of issues in the philosophy of science and may, we suggest, even help us think about improving the public understanding of science.

Parmenides may fairly be said to have undertaken two parallel efforts: first, to offer a persuasive account of the nature of ‘what-is’ (to eon); and second, to establish ‘it is’ as the only true and trustworthy way of speaking and thinking about what-is. Fragment 7.3-6 plays a crucial role in this latter effort when Parmenides’ goddess directs the youth to put aside all information obtained through sense perception and instead ‘judge by reason the poludêris elenchos spoken by me.’ Although the (...) meaning of the phrase has been variously understood, I argue that it is properly taken to mean ‘a much-contested testing’ (of the possible ways of inquiry). In characterizing the elenchos as poludêris or ‘much contested’ the goddess is asserting that the decision to follow the ‘it is’ route of inquiry must be continually reaffirmed against the pull of custom and sense experience. (shrink)

Applied philosophy is experiencing its “golden days,” as Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen says in his insightful introduction to A Companion to Applied Philosophy. Applied philosophy seems to be distinguished from its opposite, pure philosophy, usually understood as traditional philosophy, which deals with subjects such as free will, consciousness, or knowledge in philosophical subdisciplines like ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. To embrace applied philosophy could thus mean to advocate for a philosophy that deals with questions “relevant to ‘the important questions of everyday life,’” as (...) Leslie Stevenson puts it, as opposed to questions that arise from within the subdisciplines of pure philosophy. (shrink)

I begin by picking up on Brandom’s suggestion that expressivism follows American pragmatism in seeking to advance the cause of the Enlightenment. This provides us with a first point of contrast with Taylor’s understanding of expressivism, since Taylor takes expressivism to be inseparably bound up with the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment and as fundamentally opposed to Enlightenment naturalism. I then distinguish two features of what we ordinarily mean by the term ‘expression’, one of which provides an intuitive basis for (...) understanding Brandom’s expressivist program, the other of which provides an interpretive key for understanding Taylor’s version of expressivism. After looking briefly at the main tenets of Taylor’s expressivism, I conclude by considering its relation to Romanticism on the one hand, and to Brandom’s expressivist renewal of the Enlightenment project on the other. (shrink)

Although the commentary on Aristotle’s problematic discussion of slavery is vast, his discussion of nobility receives little attention. The fragments of his dialogue On Noble Birth constitute his most extensive examination of nobility, and while their similarity to the παμβασιλεύς of the Politics has recently been recognized, their relevance to natural slavery has hitherto gone unnoticed. Yet by declaring that true nobles – particularly the god-like ἀρχηγός – preternaturally possess superhuman characteristics, Aristotle precludes their easy inclusion in the kind “human” (...) in a manner inversely mirroring the preternatural subhumanity of natural slaves. Building on recent scholarship which argues that Aristotle’s “defense” of natural slaves is better understood as an indictment, On Noble Birth becomes most coherent if read as a hypothetical investigation into what would be required for “nobility” to name something true rather than equivocal, with the conclusion that “true nobility” is an empty set. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy took a wrong turn when it rehabilitated direct realism. From the perspective of cognitive science, it seems that we can have the directness-claim or the realism-claim but not both together. Up until the mid-1900s the vast majority of philosophers dismissed direct realism as hopelessly naïve, but by the close of the century it had become the orthodoxy within analytic philosophy. In contrast, mainstream cognitive science has remained constant in its opposition to the directness-claim, and when the directness-claim is (...) maintained, by an avowedly-radical minority, it is at the expense of the realism-claim. (shrink)

The current informal practice of pharmacometrics as a combination art and science makes it hard to appreciate the role that informatics can and should play in the future of the discipline and to comprehend the gaps that exist because of its absence. The development of pharmacometric informatics has important implications for expediting decision making and for improving the reliability of decisions made in model-based development. We argue that well-defined informatics for pharmacometrics can lead to much needed improvements in the efficiency, (...) effectiveness, and reliability of the pharmacometrics process. The purpose of this paper is to provide a description of the pervasive yet often poorly appreciated role of informatics in improving the process of data assembly, a critical task in the delivery of pharmacometric analysis results. First, we provide a brief description of the pharmacometric analysis process. Second, we describe the business processes required to create analysis-ready data sets for the pharmacometrician. Third, we describe selected informatic elements required to support the pharmacometrics and data assembly processes. Finally, we offer specific suggestions for performing a systematic analysis of existing challenges as an approach to defi ning the next generation of pharmacometric informatics. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that many criticisms of McDowell’s naturalism of second nature are based on what I call ‘the orthodox interpretation’ of McDowell’s naturalism. The orthodox interpretation is, however, a misinterpretation, which results from the fact that the phrase ‘the space of reasons’ is used equivocally by McDowell in Mind and World. Failing to distinguish two senses of ‘the space of reasons’, I argue that the orthodox interpretation renders McDowell’s naturalism inconsistent with McDowell’s Hegelian thesis that the conceptual (...) is unbounded. My interpretation saves McDowell from being inconsistent. However, the upshot of my interpretation is that what is really at work in McDowell’s diagnosis of the dualism between nature and reason is the Hegelian thesis, not the naturalism of second nature. (shrink)

Since the millennium, first person accounts of experience have been accepted as philosophically valid, potentially useful sources of information about the nature of mind and self. Several Vedic sciences rely on such first person accounts to discuss experience and consciousness. This paper shows that their insights define the information structure of experience in agreement with a scientific theory of mind fulfilling all presently known philosophical and scientific conditions. Experience has two separate components, its information content, and a separate ‘witness aspect’, (...) which can reflect on all forms of experience, and with training be strengthened until its power of reflection identifies it as the innermost aspect of ‘self’. The Vedic sciences, Sankhya, Yoga and Vedanta develop these themes. Sankhya identifies the different aspects of experience, outer and inner; Yoga practices lead the mind to inner states without information content (samadhi) in which the experience of the witness (sakshi) is strengthened and deepened. Vedanta states the nature of the ‘self’ is to know itself directly without intermediary. All this requires the witness to have a singular loop structure. The information structure of experience therefore has two aspects, information content plus a singular loop endowing it with a subjective sense of ‘Self’. (shrink)

Value Sensitive Design (VSD) is an established method for integrating values into technical design. It has been applied to different technologies and, more recently, to artificial intelligence (AI). We argue that AI poses a number of challenges specific to VSD that require a somewhat modified VSD approach. Machine learning (ML), in particular, poses two challenges. First, humans may not understand how an AI system learns certain things. This requires paying attention to values such as transparency, explicability, and accountability. Second, ML (...) may lead to AI systems adapting in ways that ‘disembody’ the values embedded in them. To address this, we propose a threefold modified VSD approach: 1) integrating a known set of VSD principles (AI4SG) as design norms from which more specific design requirements can be derived; 2) distinguishing between values that are promoted and respected by the design to ensure outcomes that not only do no harm but also contribute to good; and 3) extending the VSD process to encompass the whole life cycle of an AI technology in order to monitor unintended value consequences and redesign as needed. We illustrate our VSD for AI approach with an example use case of a SARS-CoV-2 contact tracing app. (shrink)

While examining the important role of imagination in making moral judgments, John Dewey and Moral Imagination focuses new attention on the relationship between American pragmatism and ethics. Steven Fesmire takes up threads of Dewey's thought that have been largely unexplored and elaborates pragmatism's distinctive contribution to understandings of moral experience, inquiry, and judgment. Building on two Deweyan notions—that moral character, belief, and reasoning are part of a social and historical context and that moral deliberation is an imaginative, dramatic rehearsal (...) of possibilities—Fesmire shows that moral imagination can be conceived as a process of aesthetic perception and artistic creativity. Fesmire's original readings of Dewey shed new light on the imaginative process, human emotional make-up and expression, and the nature of moral judgment. This original book presents a robust and distinctly pragmatic approach to ethics, politics, moral education, and moral conduct. [The downloadable sample is Chapter Seven, "The Moral Artist."]. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende establecer los límites y alcances de las principales interpretaciones de Newton en el siglo XX, resaltando, de un lado, la evidencia textual de la que disponían los intérpretes y, de otro, las corrientes filosóficas y epistemológicas que definen los rasgos principales de sus interpretaciones. Se verá que el rechazo al positivismo no es condición suficiente para establecer una interpretación adecuada y que, de la mano del fortalecimiento de la investigación a partir de los manuscritos de Newton, se (...) hace necesario un modelo interpretativo más amplio, flexible y detallado que los establecidos por algunos de los más importantes estudiosos como Alexandre Koyré, I. Bernard Cohen, Betty Dobbs y Richard Westfall. (shrink)

Healthcare is becoming increasingly automated with the development and deployment of care robots. There are many benefits to care robots but they also pose many challenging ethical issues. This paper takes care robots for the elderly as the subject of analysis, building on previous literature in the domain of the ethics and design of care robots. Using the value sensitive design approach to technology design, this paper extends its application to care robots by integrating the values of care, values that (...) are specific to AI, and higher-scale values such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The ethical issues specific to care robots for the elderly are discussed at length alongside examples of specific design requirements that work to ameliorate these ethical concerns. (shrink)

Con el fin de discutir las relaciones entre ética, política y educación, el presente artículo analizala crisis del sistema educativo argentino a partir de una categoría ética: la responsabilidad. Más específicamente, se intenta delinear algunos de los retos a los que una educación para la responsabi..

The capacity to act in accordance with one’s morality (broadly construed) is constitutive of moral agency. This capacity can be undermined—in whole or in part—by for instance, hypnosis, addiction, or obsessive-compulsion. Another way this capacity can be undermined is through poor moral reasoning. Moral irrationality can frustrate one’s capacity to act in accordance with one’s morality and in turn, stunt one’s moral agency. In a similar respect, improving moral rationality can strengthen this capacity and enhance moral agency. The empirical research (...) program on (non-moral) cognitive debiasing inspires developing techniques to improve our moral rational capacities—i.e., moral debiasing. Yet, moral debiasing presupposes moral biases—that is, systematic moral errors. So, what are moral errors exactly? The pertinent kind is subjective moral errors. Ultimately, A’s φ-ing is a subjective moral error insofar as φ-ing deviates from A’s genuine morality per instrumental subjective moral rationality (ISMR)—i.e., insofar as φ-ing frustrates A+’s morally-relevant ends, wherein A+ is a counterfactual idealization of A upon whom is bestowed those endowments that A considers authoritative under ordinary optimal conditions. The provision of an in-principle standard of subjective moral error lays important theoretical groundwork for future empirical inquiry into subjective moral debiasing. (shrink)

Some experts have argued that patients facing certain types of choices should not be told whether their risk is above or below average, because this information may trigger a bias (Fagerlin et al. 2007). But careful consideration shows that the comparative risk heuristic can usefully guide decisions and improve their quality or rationality. Building on an earlier paper of mine (Schwartz 2009), I will argue here that doctors and decision aids should provide comparative risk information to patients, even while further (...) research is conducted. (shrink)

Of primary importance in formulating a response to the increasing prevalence and power of artificial intelligence (AI) applications in society are questions of ontology. Questions such as: What “are” these systems? How are they to be regarded? How does an algorithm come to be regarded as an agent? We discuss three factors which hinder discussion and obscure attempts to form a clear ontology of AI: (1) the various and evolving definitions of AI, (2) the tendency for pre-existing technologies to be (...) assimilated and regarded as “normal,” and (3) the tendency of human beings to anthropomorphize. This list is not intended as exhaustive, nor is it seen to preclude entirely a clear ontology, however, these challenges are a necessary set of topics for consideration. Each of these factors is seen to present a 'moving target' for discussion, which poses a challenge for both technical specialists and non-practitioners of AI systems development (e.g., philosophers and theologians) to speak meaningfully given that the corpus of AI structures and capabilities evolves at a rapid pace. Finally, we present avenues for moving forward, including opportunities for collaborative synthesis for scholars in philosophy and science. (shrink)

As the Zika virus pandemic continues to bring worry and fear to health officials and medical scientists, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and World Health Organization (WHO) have recommended that residents of the Zika-infected countries, e.g., Brazil, and those who have traveled to the area should delay having babies which may involve artificial contraceptive, particularly condom. This preventive policy, however, is seemingly at odds with the Roman Catholic Church’s position on the contraceptive. As least since the promulgation of (...) Paul VI’s 1968 encyclical, Humanae Vitae, the Church has explicitly condemned artificial birth control as intrinsic evil. However, the current pontiff, Pope Francis, during his recent visit to Latin America, remarked that the use of artificial contraception may not be in contradiction to the teaching of Humanae Vitae while drawing a parallel between the current Zika Crisis and the 1960’s Belgian Congo Nun Controversy. The pope mentioned that the traditional ethical principle of the lesser of two evils may be the doctrine that justified the exceptions. The authors of this paper attempt to expand the theological rationale of the pope’s suggestion. In so doing, the authors rely on casuistical reasoning as an analytic tool that compares the Belgian Congo Nun case and the given Zika case, and suggest that the former is highly similar to, if not the same as, the latter in terms of normative moral feature. That is, in both cases the use of artificial contraception is theologically justified in reference to the criteria that the doctrine of the lesser of two evils requires. The authors wish that the paper would provide a solid theological-ethical ground based on which condom-use as the most immediate and effective preventive measure can be recommended in numerous Catholic hospitals as well as among Catholic communities in the world, particularly the most Zika-affected and largest Catholic community in the world, Brazil – 123 million present Brazilian citizens are reported to be Roman Catholic. (shrink)

This paper focuses on stakeholder identification as per the value sensitive design (VSD) approach applied to the context of quantum technologies (QT). We provide two comprehensive lists of stakeholders as starting points for VSD researchers and practitioners. These lists encompass a diverse range of organizations, including private companies, government agencies, NGOs, partnerships, and professional/trade organizations. Our aim is to facilitate the recognition, legitimation, and understanding of stakeholder interactions in the development of QT. These stakeholder lists can serve as a foundation (...) for designing and implementing policies and strategies that promote the ethical and responsible development of QT, considering the values and interests of various stakeholders. Furthermore, these lists can enable empirical and technical studies on specific QT innovations using an ethics-by-design approach like VSD. Overall, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the complex and dynamic nature of the QT landscape and highlights the importance of stakeholder engagement and collaboration in shaping its future. (shrink)

Safe-by-Design (SBD) frameworks for the development of emerging technologies have become an ever more popular means by which scholars argue that transformative emerging technologies can safely incorporate human values. One such popular SBD methodology is called Value Sensitive Design (VSD). A central tenet of this design methodology is to investigate stakeholder values and design those values into technologies during early stage research and development (R&D). To accomplish this, the VSD framework mandates that designers consult the philosophical and ethical literature to (...) best determine how to weigh moral trade-offs. However, the VSD framework also concedes the universalism of moral values, particularly the values of freedom, autonomy, equality trust and privacy justice. This paper argues that the VSD methodology, particularly applied to nano-bio-info-cogno (NBIC) technologies, has an insufficient grounding for the determination of moral values. As such, an exploration of the value-investigations of VSD are deconstructed to illustrate both its strengths and weaknesses. This paper also provides possible modalities for the strengthening of the VSD methodology, particularly through the application of moral imagination and how moral imagination exceed the boundaries of moral intuitions in the development of novel technologies. (shrink)

One of the primary, if not most critical, difficulties in the design and implementation of autonomous systems is the black-boxed nature of the decision-making structures and logical pathways. How human values are embodied and actualised in situ may ultimately prove to be harmful if not outright recalcitrant. For this reason, the values of stakeholders become of particular significance given the risks posed by opaque structures of intelligent agents (IAs). This paper explores how decision matrix algorithms, via the belief-desire-intention model for (...) autonomous vehicles, can be designed to minimize the risks of opaque architectures. Primarily through an explicit orientation towards designing for the values of explainability and verifiability. In doing so, this research adopts the Value Sensitive Design (VSD) approach as a principled framework for the incorporation of such values within design. VSD is recognized as a potential starting point that offers a systematic way for engineering teams to formally incorporate existing technical solutions within ethical design, while simultaneously remaining pliable to emerging issues and needs. It is concluded that the VSD methodology offers at least a strong enough foundation from which designers can begin to anticipate design needs and formulate salient design flows that can be adapted to the changing ethical landscapes required for utilisation in autonomous vehicles. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I construct scientifically and practically adequate moral analogs of cognitive heuristics and biases. Cognitive heuristics are reasoning “shortcuts” that are efficient but flawed. Such flaws yield systematic judgment errors—i.e., cognitive biases. For example, the availability heuristic infers an event’s probability by seeing how easy it is to recall similar events. Since dramatic events, such as airplane crashes, are disproportionately easy to recall, this heuristic explains systematic overestimations of their probability (availability bias). The research program on cognitive heuristics (...) and biases (e.g., Daniel Kahneman’s work) has been scientifically successful and has yielded useful error-prevention techniques—i.e., cognitive debiasing. I attempt to apply this framework to moral reasoning to yield moral heuristics and biases. For instance, a moral bias of unjustified differences in the treatment of particular animal species might be partially explained by a moral heuristic that dubiously infers animals’ moral status from their aesthetic features. While the basis for identifying judgments as cognitive errors is often unassailable (e.g., per violating laws of logic), identifying moral errors seemingly requires appealing to moral truth, which, I argue, is problematic within science. Such appeals can be avoided by repackaging moral theories as mere “standards-of-interest” (a la non-normative metrics of purportedly right-making features/properties). However, standards-of-interest do not provide authority, which is needed for effective debiasing. Nevertheless, since each person deems their own subjective morality authoritative, subjective morality (qua standard-of-interest and not moral subjectivism) satisfies both scientific and practical concerns. As such, (idealized) subjective morality grounds a moral analog of cognitive biases—namely, subjective moral biases (e.g., committed anti-racists unconsciously discriminating). I also argue that "cognitive heuristic" is defined by its contrast with rationality. Consequently, heuristics explain biases, which are also so defined. However, such contrasting with rationality is causally irrelevant to cognition. This frustrates the presumed usefulness of the kind, heuristic, in causal explanation. As such, in the moral case, I jettison the role of causal explanation and tailor categories solely for contrastive explanation. As such, “moral heuristic” is replaced with "subjective moral fallacy," which is defined by its contrast with subjective morality and explains subjective moral biases. The resultant subjective moral biases and fallacies framework can undergird future empirical research. (shrink)

Governments around the world have faced the challenge of how to respond to the recent outbreak of a novel coronavirus disease. Some have reacted by greatly restricting the freedom of citizens, while others have opted for less drastic policies. In this paper, I draw a parallel with vaccination ethics to conceptualize two distinct approaches to COVID-19 that I call altruistic and lockdown. Given that the individual measures necessary to limit the spread of the virus can in principle be achieved voluntarily (...) as well as through enforcement, the question arises of how much freedom governments ought to give citizens to adopt the required measures. I argue that an altruistic approach is preferable on moral grounds: it preserves important citizen freedoms, avoids a number of potential injustices, and gives people a much-needed sense of meaning in precarious times. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Value Sensitive Design (VSD) methodology provides a principled approach to embedding common values in to AI systems both early and throughout the design process. To do so, it draws on an important case study: the evidence and final report of the UK Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. This empirical investigation shows that the different and often disparate stakeholder groups that are implicated in AI design and use share some common values that can be used to (...) further strengthen design coordination efforts. VSD is shown to be both able to distill these common values as well as provide a framework for stakeholder coordination. (shrink)

Robotization is an increasingly pervasive feature of our lives. Robots with high degrees of autonomy may cause harm, yet in sufciently complex systems neither the robots nor the human developers may be candidates for moral blame. John Danaher has recently argued that this may lead to a retribution gap, where the human desire for retribution faces a lack of appropriate subjects for retributive blame. The potential social and moral implications of a retribution gap are considerable. I argue that the retributive (...) intuitions that feed into retribution gaps are best understood as deontological intuitions. I apply a debunking argument for deontological intuitions in order to show that retributive intuitions cannot be used to justify retributive punishment in cases of robot harm without clear candidates for blame. The fundamental moral question thus becomes what we ought to do with these retributive intuitions, given that they do not justify retribution. I draw a parallel from recent work on implicit biases to make a case for taking moral responsibility for retributive intuitions. In the same way that we can exert some form of control over our unwanted implicit biases, we can and should do so for unjustifed retributive intuitions in cases of robot harm. (shrink)